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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY

imported rules of physics as to the momentum
force of international organization.
Christy McCormick
George Mason University
School of Law

International Economic
Organization
International law has developed to serve the
needs of the governments of "states" -- territorially-based collections of populations, united in subjection to their "sovereign" rulers. Other international organizations have long existed - the Virginia
Company, the East India Company, and the Royal
African Company provide early and influential
examples - but without much formal recognition
in developing international legal structures. Now
their day has come, and eager academics seek to
apply the insights of institutional economics, law
and economics and industrial organization to international law, to demarcate new lines of competence between states and other international organizations.
The basic premise of most such studies has been
the so-called "Coase theorem", which concentrates
on "transaction costs" to explain (and evaluate)
most structures in society. Everything should be
organized to minimize transaction costs. That
Coase never said or wrote any such thing does not
diminish the influence of this norm, particularly
among lawyers. Applied to international law by
Joel Trachtman, this becomes an assertion that international institutions exist to maximize net gains
"from engaging in the transaction in power" minus transaction costs. Any constraint imposed on
a state, according to this definition, is a "transaction in power", which states undertake to make
gains in other areas.

Transactions in Power
States have power. A government's power or
control over people and territory is what makes
states states. States relinquish this grudgingly, and
if they relinquish too much, cease to be "states" in
the international sense, becoming mere administrative units of larger federations, like the states of
the American union. Power can be spent to buy
cooperation from other states, or retained to force
ASIL
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cooperation by threats or coercion. When states
retain power, a "state of nature" can be said to exist. When they trade power, new law will be created.
Thus the market in power sets the frontiers of
municipal law, diminishing states to empower
other organizations. States allow this for the
"gains" such trades bring in wealth or happiness,
but always at the cost of power, which must be
displaced, by definition, for a "transaction in
power" to have taken place. When States cede jurisdiction to gain peace or profit, they exit the "market" of autonomous individual powers, and enter
the "firm" of international organization.
Coase-based theories ascribe the choice between
"market" and "firm"-like organization to their relative transaction costs. States will simply trade directly for what they want when it is easy to do so.
When it is not, they often prefer to create non-state
organizations to coordinate their transactions. The
"best" arrangement, in the eyes of "economically"minded lawyers such as Joel Trachtman, will be
the method that allows people to obtain the maximum of what they want, with the minimum transaction costs. Large gains may justify large transaction costs. Small gains maybe acceptable if transaction costs are negligible. But power will only be
sold for some valuable benefit, or to cheapen transaction costs.

The Purpose of Government
Applying the "Coase" theorem to states in this
way reveals the enormous difference between governments and most firms. Markets in goods exchanged for profit may realize absolute gains by
minimizing transaction costs. "Markets" in power
trade sovereignty for peace or protection as often
as for commerce or wealth. Some states exist to
maximize the wealth of their rulers, but others seek
the common good of their citizens, or of a faction,
or world justice, or some religious mandate.
"Transaction costs" is a very awkward description
of what matters in most international transactions.
All states claim to serve the common good of
their citizens. Some claim to serve "justice" or the
common good of humanity. In neither case does
"gain" provide a very helpful description of what
is sought, or "transaction costs" accurately capture
the difficulties of getting it. In a "republic", for
example, (a state actually committed to pursuing
of the common good), the primary constitutional

2223 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW ° WASHINGTON, DC 20008

*

1997

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY - 47

question in both external and internal affairs will
be how best to identify the common good. The
constitution or "firm" established by such states
will seek to minimize mistakes. To call these mistakes "transaction costs" would be misleading.
Perhaps one might understand corruption as the
"transaction costs" of republican governments.
Self-dealing (on this theory) will be present in any
structure that seeks justice, and should be minimized. But speaking of "firms" and "transaction
costs" in such situations only confuses the discussion. This will be true of most "transactions in
power". States relinquish power to serve determinate ends, and the main question to be asked when
states cede power to international organizations
should be whether these ends will be served by
the transaction. Does this international organization serve justice better than the state can?

Justice
"Justice" and "the common good" have a resonance in relations between states that the vocabulary of economic theory entirely fails to capture.
The comparative-transaction-cost methodology
facilitates innovation by viewing institutions as
contingent. But this benefit palls when it sacrifices
the vocabulary of liberty and justice, which
delegitimize bad structures of government much
better, with more fidelity to ordinary usage and
what issues are really at stake. Economicallyminded lawyers tend to speak and write of "satisfying" the preferences of all countries (or their citizens), rather than shaping or judging these preferences - the primary purpose of "law" of any kind.
The "Coase" theorem applied to law implies a
faulty theory of human values and motivation that
vitiates its usefulness as a heuristic device. All law
claims to be just. Systems of power that do not
claim to seek justice are not law. Human nature
tends to self-justification, and even repressive systems justify themselves to themselves as serving
the common good. This makes interest-based conceptions of law inaccurate, unless one defines justice as an "interest" like any other. But in legal systems justice is not an interest like any other. To
describe or explain it in this way (even if possible)
would be confusing and misleading.
Lawyers apply the theory of the firm to international institutions to promote cooperative solutions to inter-state coordination problems. Creating an international regime that minimizes the fricASIL *

tion involved in necessary international transactions would be a valuable achievement. But any
such arrangement not founded on justice will be
unstable, or undesirable, or both. Some lawyers
may feel, with John Rawls, that justice is found best
by avoiding substantive morality, which fosters the
transaction cost of self-righteousness. But "efficiency" is not a standard to rally around either.
Laws in general and international law in particular depend on justice for their binding force. Economic tactics will never produce agreement about
the issues that really matter in international law.

International Organization
Perhaps this is all really just an argument about
how best to constitute the international system to
serve the purposes of international cooperation whatever they are. For those who like justice, a
lawyer-economist might say, we can talk about how
best to find justice. For those who like trade, we
can talk about maximizing trade. Those who like
their own private unfettered world dominion can
evaluate international organizations according to
how these serve that end. All governments (or the
individuals who control them) have interests, and
international organizations serve those interests, or
they would not exist.
Legal theorists, in such a scheme, write either
to describe this situation, or at best to point out
how it could run more smoothly. The theory of
the firm might be useful here to show how two
states could coordinate their disparate interests to
achieve mutually satisfactory results, with a minimum of transaction costs. The trouble is that states
do not necessarily aim at such cooperation, nor
should they. States often prefer to impose their
will on others. States do not only trade power for
interest. They also use power for domination.
Force is just or unjust, lawful or unlawful, according to the ends it serves. International organizations do and should exist, not simply to facilitate
the interests of states, but also to promote certain
ends over others. Efficiency is usually a secondary interest.
Some states originated as profit-seeking
shareholding corporations. Virginia and Massachusetts still retain traces of their earliest corporate charters in institutions that provided a model
for many Western democracies. The analogy be
tween states and corporations is not absurd. States
that choose to cooperate through the mediation of
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international organizations may look a bit like corporations that merge into a single holding company.
But this does not mean that international institutions should exist only when their agency costs are
smaller than the alternative transaction costs of the
same allocation through the market, as Coase might
have it. International organizations exist to prevent power transactions, and to impose goals that
frustrate normal "markets" - not make them more
efficient.

The Market for Power
International organizations supersede states, in
pursuit of certain goals. They emerge not from a
"market for power" but from a desire for justice.
States control each other's excesses by deferring to
international institutions. Some international relationships could be described in Coasian vocabulary. War incurs high transaction costs. A just
world order would be a valuable transaction gain,
possibly outweighed by the transaction costs of
imposing or achieving justice. Simply to speak or
to write in these terms illustrates the vacuity of doing so.
International organizations concerned with
commerce may fit the "Coasian" model better, because they really are economic, and concerned with
self-interest in the narrowest, monetarily quantifiable sense that most economic models necessarily
assume. International economic integration may
follow the theory of the firm in ways that would
permit the application (in some narrow circumstances) of economic formulas computing the net
gains from transactions, after subtracting the transaction costs.
The market for power is not a market in goods
or interests, but a market in moral perceptions,
where states must justify their use of power to
themselves, and sometimes to others. Governments that relinquish power, do so either because
they are forced to (in which case they never fully
enjoyed power at all) or because they are convinced
that some interest outside the state justifies weakening the state to serve a greater good. Speaking
in terms of the market undermines the moral constraints that sometimes lead to the (rare) abdications of power that make international institutions
possible at all.
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Conclusion
Joel Trachtman rightly observes that the best
laboratories for analyzing legal institutions will always be comparative and historical. Everything
else is pure speculation. Those who propose

change must look to what has worked before, in
comparable situations. The greatest difficulty lies
in identifying what is "comparable", and the
proper standards of evaluation. The theory of the
firm and other "Coasian" constructs mislead as a
basis for comparison, because their circumstances
are so different from those of states. They also fail
as standards of evaluation, because they rest on
economic premises that contravene the basic purposes of law.
Law schools have seen a great vogue for importing techniques from other social science disciplines. This reflects a widespread loss of faith in
the integrity of law as its own discipline, the study
of justice. Unfortunately, techniques from other
disciplines usually, carry their own ethos with
them. The values of the business world are overwhelmingly self-interested and generally mercenary. These may be appropriate in the economic
sphere, but they are highly pernicious to community and justice. The vocabulary lawyers use colors the results that they can and will achieve.
"Coasian" terms are not appropriate to principled
legal discourse.
International law, more than most law, depends
on moral weight for compliance, particularly when
powerful interests are at stake. The language of
institutional economics, law and economics and
industrial organization, which carry no such
weight, provide a feeble basis for demarcating new
lines of competence between states and other international organizations. Their use puts off the
day when better institutions will facilitate transactions among well-intentioned states.
Mortimer Sellers
University of Baltimore
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